From Grok:

The X post by epidemiologist Nicolas Hulscher highlights a 2025 study where Ewingella americana, isolated from Japanese tree frog guts, achieved 100% complete tumor regression in mice with colorectal cancer after a single intravenous dose.

In the JAIST-led research using Colon-26 tumor-bearing mice, the bacterium outperformed anti-PD-L1 immunotherapy and doxorubicin chemotherapy via dual mechanisms: selective proliferation (3000-fold) in hypoxic tumors for direct cytotoxicity and activation of T cells, B cells, and neutrophils for immune attack.

The treatment showed rapid bacterial clearance from blood within 24 hours, no significant organ toxicity or long-term side effects at effective doses, and induced durable immunity as rechallenged mice rejected new tumors.

From Grok:

Primarily two countries: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to multiple reports. Jordan is mentioned in at least one account.

• Egypt: Issued multiple warnings in the months and weeks before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks. Intelligence chief Abbas Kamel reportedly flew to Israel around September 26, 2023 (about 11 days prior), warning that the situation in Gaza was dire and “could blow up.” He later called Netanyahu days before the attack with a further alert. Warnings continued until roughly 48 hours–3 days prior, according to reports citing Arab officials and corroborated by U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul. Outlets including The Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, The Times of Israel, and others have covered this. theatlantic.com
• UAE: President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) reportedly called Netanyahu personally in late September 2023 (roughly 10 days before the attacks) for about 45 minutes, warning that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major operation (“earthquake”/“zilzal”) that could destabilize the region. This was first detailed in a Haaretz investigation/book excerpt and later confirmed or corroborated by The New York Times, The Atlantic, and others. Netanyahu’s office has denied aspects of the account and threatened legal action against Haaretz.

One report also notes that Jordan’s intelligence chief separately warned Israeli counterparts that the situation had grown potentially explosive.

These foreign warnings (which generally lacked precise timing or full tactical details) occurred alongside extensive internal Israeli intelligence indicators that were dismissed or not fully acted upon. Netanyahu has maintained that he was not adequately briefed by Israel’s security establishment and has disputed the foreign warnings. The reports remain contested in some official Israeli statements, but they come from multiple independent journalistic sources relying on Arab, U.S., and other officials.

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Concerning reports of a stand-down order including a reference to Charlie Kirk from Grok:

No credible, verified sources from official IDF inquiries, major Israeli media investigations, or mainstream international outlets have confirmed a deliberate high-level “stand-down” order on October 7, 2023, issued to allow the Hamas attack to proceed. Official probes and reporting attribute the delayed response to intelligence failures, underestimation of the threat, holiday staffing shortfalls, command-and-control breakdowns, and the scale of the multi-pronged assault.

Localized or low-level orders to cancel or delay routine border patrols have been reported in a few places:

• Golani Brigade soldier Shalom Sheetrit testified before a Knesset committee (around mid-2025) that he and fellow soldiers received a message around 5:20 a.m. on October 7 ordering no patrols along the Gaza fence until 9:00 a.m. He described the order as unusual/strange. Video of the testimony has circulated widely on social media and secondary sites.
• The BBC reported that Golani soldiers preparing for a standard pre-dawn patrol near Nahal Oz were instructed by superiors around 5:30 a.m. to delay it and stand back because of a perceived anti-tank missile threat. Multiple soldiers confirmed this to the BBC. A retired IDF general described it as standard protocol to avoid exposing troops as targets during suspected threats; Hamas appears to have exploited the delay. This was not framed as a broad stand-down of the defense.

Broader claims of a coordinated stand-down (often tied to false-flag theories involving Netanyahu or top command) originated mainly in conspiracy-oriented commentary (e.g., early speculation by figures like Charlie Kirk) and have been amplified on social media, alternative outlets, and some pro-Palestinian media. These lack supporting documents, high-level admissions, or corroboration in IDF investigations or reputable reporting. Forbes and other outlets described the early versions as unsubstantiated.

In short: a small number of specific, localized patrol-related orders or delays are documented in soldier testimony and BBC reporting; claims of a deliberate, system-wide stand-down order enabling the attack have no confirmed support in official or major investigative sources.

From Grok:

Iran is the primary external supplier of missiles and missile technology to the Houthis (Ansar Allah).

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, provides ballistic and cruise missiles (or components/kits based on Iranian designs), along with training, technical advisors, guidance systems, warheads, and related support. This includes systems derived from Iranian models such as variants of the Qiam, Shahab, Kheibar Shekan, and anti-ship missiles like the Ghadir.

Key evidence includes:

• Multiple large interdictions of Iranian-origin weapons shipments (including hundreds of tons of missiles, components, seekers, and warheads) by Yemeni forces and others, with Iranian markings and documentation. alhurra.com +1
• UN Panel of Experts reports concluding that the Houthis lack the independent capacity for complex systems like advanced ballistic and cruise missiles and that their capabilities stem from Iranian (and allied) transfers of materiel, technology, and training. Similarities to Iranian systems are well-documented. apnews.com +1
• Analyses by groups like Conflict Armament Research showing Iranian missile designations on components recovered in seizures, even as many dual-use parts come from commercial global sources.

The Houthis also assemble and produce some systems locally using Iranian designs, kits, expertise, and captured legacy Yemeni stockpiles (e.g., earlier Scud-type missiles). Dual-use commercial components (electronics, materials) frequently originate from China and other countries via supply chains, while groups like Hezbollah and Iraqi militias have provided additional training and support. Longer-range and more advanced systems remain heavily dependent on external (primarily Iranian) input.

Iran officially denies supplying missiles or weapons to the Houthis, stating it offers only political support and that the group develops its own capabilities. These denials are contradicted by the pattern of interdictions, technical matching of components, and assessments from UN experts, Western governments, and independent arms researchers.

Nassim Taleb’s assessments should always be considered to be valuable information.