Something’s brewing between Israel and Iran. Again. But it’s not what the typical headlines will sell you.
The June 2025 “12-day war” looked devastating on paper. Israel struck Iran. Iran fired back with hundreds of missiles. The US joined with B-2 bombers. Everyone claimed victory. Ceasefire brokered. War over.
Except here’s what didn’t happen: radiation leakage.
You know what happens when you blow up active nuclear facilities? Chernobyl-level panic. Radiation monitors screaming. IAEA emergency sessions.
Instead?
Silence.
h/t Wes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Update:
Please read the entire article on The Burning Platform prior to commenting. There are two points:
- No radiation leaks at the Fordow site.
- No secondary explosions at other sites with conventional weapons.
Then read the comments already posted for this article.
9 responses to “A Good Case”
No radiation leakage is a surprise? Maybe I didn’t read that right.
Would there actually be radiation leakage if the radioactive material was buried 400 feet below ground?
Regardless, if the cyclotrons and other equipment were buried under a mountain of rubble, wouldn’t that end a nuclear program for many months/years because there would be no way to refine them further to weapons grade status.
No secondary explosions? First, the collapse of a cavernous interior would likely deny oxygen for flammable material to explode/burn. Second, even if oxygen was still available to create a conflagration, this was a nuclear facility, not an ammunition dump. Exactly why is it a mystery if large secondary explosions don’t occur? Would it be particularly surprising if the US had bombed an Iranian library and there were no large secondary explosions?
What did I miss here? I’m open to other views here.
From Grok:
Yes, during the Twelve-Day War (June 13–24, 2025) between Iran and Israel, multiple Iranian sites targeted by Israeli strikes experienced secondary explosions, often indicative of stored munitions, fuel, or explosives detonating after the initial impact. These were reported primarily through social media videos and eyewitness accounts, as official confirmations from either side were limited. Below are key examples:Piranshahr, Western Iran: Israeli strikes on a site in this area triggered secondary explosions, captured in video footage showing multiple fireballs and plumes of smoke rising from the horizon.
Tabriz weapons and ballistic missile depot: One of Iran’s largest depots in northwest Iran was hit, resulting in massive secondary explosions visible from afar, with ongoing detonations and fires spreading across the site.
Parchin military-industrial complex: Located near Tehran, this facility—used for ammunition and explosives testing, with possible nuclear ties—showed explosions in footage, likely including secondary blasts from stored materials.
Unspecified air defense system: Strikes on an Iranian air defense site caused secondary explosions following the second impact, as seen in video evidence.
This reply addresses strikes on conventional military sites only.
How is it in any way related to the strike on the nuclear site?
See my other reply. I broke my reply into two separate replies.
Sorry, I’m still not seeing a comment that explains why one would expect secondary explosions from a strike on Iran’s nuclear facility. From the prior photos of the facility that made the rounds on the internet, the equipment had the look that was more “biochemical lab” or “operating room.” No particular reason comes to mind that would justify keeping explosive material anywhere near the cyclotrons.
Yes, there was much discussion about the prospect that Iran got its nuclear material out of the complex before the strike. Photos of a long line of large trucks at the site a couple of days earlier supported that possibility. Yet, again, how would that affect the secondary explosions issue, much less eliminate the positive effects from leaving Iran with nuclear material that Iran, itself, could no longer process because the necessary equipment and instruments were under hundreds of tons of rubble?
From Grok:
Regarding whether radioactive material was present (i.e., “buried”) at the time of the bombing without leaking: Reports are conflicting, reflecting the fog of war and limited access for independent verification.Some US intelligence assessments and expert analyses indicate enriched uranium stockpiles were moved out of Fordow (and other sites) in the days leading up to the US strikes, after Israel’s initial attacks began on June 13. This evacuation of “critical materials” minimized potential risks and damage, with no material left to leak.
5 sources
Iranian media and officials claimed most of the enriched uranium (hundreds of kilograms at up to 60% purity, a step away from weapons-grade) was relocated to undisclosed sites beforehand.
Contrasting reports from other US intelligence sources (cited by Sen. Markwayne Mullin) suggest Iran did not move the nuclear material from Fordow prior to the bombing, and may have even stored more there, assuming the site’s deep burial made it impenetrable. In this scenario, the buried radioactive material remained during the strike but did not result in any leakage or dispersal.
Want an exercise in thinking outside the box? Really, really way, way outside the box?
The Physics of Fear: Why Nuclear Weapons Cannot Exist
https://unbekoming.substack.com/p/the-physics-of-fear-why-nuclear-weapons
From Grok: Claim 1 of 6 explaining why this article is baseless.
Claim 1: Nuclear Fission Produces No Gas, So No Explosion Is Possible
The article asserts: “Nuclear weapons cannot exist because explosions require rapidly expanding gas to create destructive blast waves, but nuclear fission produces only heat and radiation – no gas whatsoever.” It compares this to chemical explosives like TNT and cites reactor meltdowns (e.g., Chernobyl) as evidence that fission just melts things.Why This Is Wrong: This misrepresents nuclear physics. In a fission bomb, the chain reaction releases ~200 MeV per fission event—millions of times more energy than chemical bonds. This energy instantly vaporizes the fissile core (uranium or plutonium) and tamper material into superheated plasma (ionized gas at millions of degrees), which expands at supersonic speeds to create a shockwave. The surrounding air is also ionized and heated, amplifying the blast. It’s not reliant on “chemical gas expansion” like TNT; the explosion is a hydrodynamic shock from extreme thermal energy.
3 sources
Reactor meltdowns don’t explode because they’re designed to prevent rapid supercriticality—fission is throttled by control rods and moderators for steady power, not instantaneous release.
Over 2,000 nuclear tests since 1945 (documented by the U.S., USSR, and others) confirm explosive yields matching predictions, from 0.1 kt (Little Boy) to 50 Mt (Tsar Bomba).
So, the conclusion is that a large amount of nuclear material that is not yet weapons grade, much less not actually inserted into a vessel such as nuclear bomb, will not produce an explosion?